Complicity in Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex 

Online submission by Giuliana Grabina, edited by Audrey Gottschild and Miranda Kexin Hu

In The Second Sex, French writer Simone de Beauvoir offers an account of women’s unfreedom, explained in terms of how the social construction of women is fundamental to their oppression. Beauvoir articulates this idea in the notion of women as “the Other.” To be the Other is “[to be] defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.” (Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 9. ) Although it is men who cast women into this position of existential Otherness, Beauvoir claims that women have “deep-seated tendencies towards complicity,” (de Beauvoir 12) as they do not reject their position as the Other, but rather accept it and even embrace it as their raison d’être; even though doing so destroys their humanity. In my analysis of Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, I will articulate a philosophical account of the reasons that lead women to these tendencies of complicity and consider the consequences of complicity for solidarity among women. Ultimately, I contend that while Beauvoir is correct to say that women are complicit in their own and other women’s unfreedom, some of the “rewards” that come with adhering to existential otherness are not rewards at all, rather, they are punishments in the form of sexual exploitation. 

“The vicious circle”: Women’s Situation as the Other

The peculiarity of women’s situation lies in the fact that “she is a free autonomous being like all human creatures, but finds herself living in a world where men compel her to assume the status of the Other (de Beauvoir, 19)—Women are positioned in this situation, as the Other, and, in turn, are made up by the situation itself (see note).The weight of the situation already skews and mutilates the intentionality and meaning-making of consciousness. That is, the way women are stuck in their status as the Other restricts and structurally undermines their meaning-making abilities. This is notable in Beauvoir’s analogy about the “vicious circle,” wherein she describes how the social and historical representation of women serves as a mechanism to “keep women in their place.” (de Beauvoir, 15). Women’s “deep-seated tendencies towards complicity” (de Beauvoir, 12)  come from being positioned this way—they learn what they can and cannot do and who they can and cannot be. In other words, women’s identity is limited to prescribed social roles or, in Beauvoirian terms, “myths.” By “myths,” (de Beauvoir, 16)  Beauvoir refers to the fact that men have constructed women as the Other; women were never allowed to define themselves; their destinies are already determined by the social norms that men have established, which bind women to their status as the Other. The fact of the matter is women are in chains, and their servitude is all the more debasing because they cling to their chains.

Women’s Complicity: Evading Risks and Reaping Benefits

Although women’s radical freedom is hindered by the particular situation they find themselves in as the Other, women can play an active role in accepting, embracing, and perpetuating their own, as well as other women’s, subjugation. As long as their chain is long enough so that they do not feel like a prisoner, women will “convert [their] prison into a heaven of glory, [their] servitude into a sovereign of freedom.” (de Beauvoir, 664). In a culture where the value of a woman’s life is largely defined by how well she conforms to patriarchal constructs, to live as anything other than the Other would require one to renounce romantic prospects, as well as the accompanying emotional and financial security. As Beauvoir notes, “to decline to be the Other is to renounce all the advantages conferred upon them by their alliance with the superior caste,” (de Beauvoir, 12). With compliance comes reward; if women comply with their role as the Other, they may be rewarded with romantic prospects, overall social approval, as well as the ability to evade economic risks. More significantly, complicity allows women to escape the metaphysical danger of “a liberty in which ends and aims must be contrived without assistance,” (de Beauvoir, 12). Indeed, it is easier to “forgo liberty and become a thing,” (de Beauvoir, 12) than to assume one’s subjective existence. To accept the imposed predefined notions of “what it means to be a woman” is easier than accepting the responsibility that accompanies an authentically assumed existence in which one rejects ready-made values and creates meaning on one’s terms. For Beauvoir, girls are raised with the belief that they are an object akin to a knife; the function of a knife is to cut, and a good knife performs the process of cutting well. Likewise, a woman’s role is to be subservient, and a good woman performs subservience well. Women are “the creature of another’s will” (de Beauvoir, 12)—the void that needs filling, the hole that needs filling. To reject existential otherness is to renounce every notion of womanhood we have ever been taught, and for that reason alone, the path to freedom is, for many, inconceivable. 

Solidarity Among Women: 

A significant consequence of women’s complicity is their lack of concrete solidarity amongst each other. Beauvoir notes that “the bond that unites [women] to [their] oppressors is not comparable to any other,” (de Beauvoir, 11). The particularity of women’s oppression lies in the fact that they are entangled with those who oppress them. As Beauvoir argues, “[women] live dispersed among the males, attached through residence, housework, economic condition, and social standing to certain men—fathers or husbands—more firmly than they are to other women,” (de Beauvoir, 11). These intricacies between women and men make solidarity among all women incredibly difficult to achieve. Naturally, the dynamics between women, the oppressed, and men, the oppressors, are akin to Stockholm Syndrome; “if they belong to the bourgeoisie, they will feel solidarity with men of that class, and not with proletariat women; if they are white, their allegiance is to white men, not to Black women,” (de Beauvoir, 11). As a result of their allegiance to the oppressive class, women fail to perceive the commonality of their condition; women will experience male violence their entire lives and rarely make the connection that this brutality is not incidental nor isolated but rather systemic. The inability to connect male violence to a more significant structural problem is no coincidence; it is by design. To recognize our condition as collective and foster solidarity among women, we need to be able to articulate the root of our conveniently-obscured oppression. To identify ourselves with the plight of women everywhere is a revolutionary necessity. Rape is not an isolated event—it is not a thing that “bad people do sometimes”—it is symbolic of male domination, male entitlement, and male violence, which affects all women, directly or indirectly. It is a structural tool to remind women of their place in society and keep them in fear. The fact that we speak of sexual violence in terms of a “personal misfortune,” or even worse, a result of a “personal failure,” as opposed to a sex-based crime akin to femicide, benefits men as a class, absolves them of blame and prevents women from strongly converging. As Beauvoir reminds us, even the most sympathetic of men, who claim to be supportive of the feminist cause, will never give up their privileges, whose extent they can hardly measure (de Beauvoir, 16), as so much of the phallic identity and male grandiosity rests on the existence and negation of the Other. After all, what do men mean without women? This leaves us with only one solution—liberation, which can only be achieved once women recognize the commonality of their situation as the Other.    

A Critique: “Rewards” as a Testament of Women’s Objectification

While I certainly recognize how women reinforce their own and other women’s unfreedom, I would contend that many of the “rewards” that come with adhering to the socially-prescribed position as the Other are no rewards at all—they are simply objectification. Lack of complicity is punished, but complicity is also punished less obviously. Many misogynists think women have it “easy” because they can get free drinks at bars. However, these free drinks are the “reward” for women conforming to a self-image based on white supremacist standards of beauty. This is less of a reward and more of a testament to their objectification; women are given free drinks because they are the marketable product that bars and nightclubs are selling—they are selling a fantasy wherein if you buy a woman a drink, she will go home with you. A free drink is exchanged in the hope of a one-night stand in the same manner as a paid date is traded with the expectation of a quick fuck, and male kindness is contingent on the potentiality of a future fuck. While all of this may seem, at face value, “rewards,” they are punishments. Since women’s objectification is the basis that sustains male domination, women are punished through sexual exploitation for their compliance in their role as the Other. Many women fail to recognize this as a form of punishment primarily because they are taught to center their self-worth on how much they can fulfill men’s sexual fantasies. One does not punish someone by using them for their intended use; men do not regard sexual exploitation as punishment at all because women are said to be complying with their natural function; to please men. Ultimately, in Beauvoir’s account of women’s unfreedom, she describes how, although men cast women into this position as the Other, women often actively contribute and perpetuate their own and other women’s unfreedom. In a society where a woman’s worth is contingent on how well she conforms to her role as the Other, to live as anything other than the Other is to renounce all of the imposed predefined notions of “what it means to be a woman.” To reject the “myth” is to deny all of the material “rewards” that come with adherence. However, some of the “rewards” that come with adhering to existential otherness are not rewards; rather, they are punishments in the form of sexual exploitation.

Author note: By this I mean that the situation takes on two different meanings: the situation is the external environment itself, but also how women experience the environment and how the environment, in turn, comes to shape women’s perception of themselves, the world around them, etc – can be described as the internalization of the environment.

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